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bstract
We investigate the determinants of the capital structure of Brazilian companies between 2000 and 2009. We use a quantile
egression model and compare its results with the ones provided by conventional models (least squares and fixed effects). We show
hat the effects of the capital structure determinants change depending on the quantile. This can be explained by bankruptcy and
gency costs associated to the amount of debt leverage of firms, relative to each quantile. Based on these results, we analyze the
redicted effects of the two leading capital structure theories, namely pecking order and trade-off, conditioned on the determinant,
ype of debt and quantile analyzed. Our results for the size and profitability variables indicate that the pecking order theory is more
uitable to the data as the quantile increases.
 2013 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
eserved.
EL classiﬁcation: G3; G32; G34; C21
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esumo
Este estudo examina os determinantes da estrutura de capital das empresas brasileiras entre os anos de 2000 e 2009. Nós usamos
m modelo de regressão quantílica e comparamos seus resultados com aqueles fornecidos por modelos convencionais (mínimos
uadrados e efeitos fixos). Nós obtemos um melhor entendimento da estrutura de capital de empresas Brasileiras. Nós mostramos
ue os efeitos dos determinantes da estrutura de capital variam com o quantil analisado. Essa influência pode ser explicada por custos
e falência e agência associados ao nível de endividamento das empresas, em cada quantil. Tomando como base esses resultados,
ós analisamos as previsões dos efeitos das principais teorias da estrutura de capital, pecking  order  e trade-off, dependendodo
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determinante, tipo de dívida e quantil analisado. Nossos resultados para as variáveis tamanho e lucratividade mostram que a teoria
da pecking  order  se torna mais relevante à medida que os quantis aumentam.
© 2013 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
reserved.
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1.  Introduction
This paper investigates the determinants of capital structure for Brazilian companies. We identify and analyze the
determinants of the Brazilian firms’ level of indebtedness through a quantile regression (QR) approach. We show that
determinants change with the quantiles suggesting providing a better understanding of these dynamics.
The empirical identification of these determinants led to the formulation of two theories, namely trade-off and
the pecking order. While these two theories have a many features in common, they also have marked differences.
For example, the trade-off theory accepts the idea of optimal capital structure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), whereas
pecking order (Myers, 1984) rejects this idea. On the other hand, some empirical studies Titman and Wessels (1988),
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Frank and Goyal (2003b) (for international companies), and Procianoy and Schnorrenberger
(2004), Cesar and Brito (2005), Medeiros and Daher (2008) (for Brazil) indicate that firms tend to behave as if their
capital structure affects their value.
In this paper we test the validity of these theories and extend the empirical work into two forms. First, we explore
an empirical model based on QR, which is scarce in the literature and for the Brazilian case. Second, we consider the
determinants of capital structure in three ways: total, short and long term.
The QR provides a better diagnosis of the problem, since it analyzes the variable of interest, i.e. debt leverage, by a
quantile analysis. This is essential to investigate the existence of heterogeneity among firms. In addition, this method
is robust to outliers and does not discard data, which is different in comparison with other estimation methods, that
exclude outliers or extreme quantiles (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2003a), and therefore only represent
the central tendency parameters. The QR methodology was applied to capital structure by Fattouh et al. (2005) for
South Korean companies, and Qiu and Smith (2007) for UK companies. Both of these works show more robust results
than studies that have used traditional methodologies like ordinary least square (OLS), panel data, and the method
developed by Fama and Macbeth (1973).
The results show that the effects of the determinants on the level of debt leverage between quantiles for Brazilian
companies between 2000 and 2009 are not homogeneous. According to the bankruptcy costs and agency costs theories,
these levels of debt can affect the behavior of the firm. For example, the lower the quantile, the lower the cost of
bankruptcy, suggesting that a firm can easily take out loans from banks. Since QR allows the estimation of coefficients
to vary according to the degree of leverage, differences between these coefficients may emerge, which may explain
capital structure of the Brazilian firms in a new light.
The results are used to verify the validity for the Brazilian case according to the two main capital structure theories,
pecking order and trade-off. They show that the differences between quantiles are significant, which justifies the use
of the QR and proves that the conditional distribution is not homogeneous for the three forms of leverage. We have
found, in particular, that the negative effect of profitability on the capital structure increases gradually with the quantile,
i.e., the sensitivity of leverage related to a company’s profitability is lower in companies that have a lower level of
indebtedness than in firms that are highly leveraged. In this case, we agree with the pecking order theory and found
that its predictions become more accurate as the quantile increases.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a literature review of capital structure theories and
predictions of each determinant. Section 3 introduces the empirical methodology, which is based on QR, and the data.
Section 4 reports the estimated values for each factor analyzed. Finally, Section 5 presents the conclusions.2.  Literature  review
Modern research of capital structure began with the work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), who showed that when
a company is under certain conditions, such as the absence of taxes, it is unable to change its value by changing
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ts capital structure. This work led to several studies examining the impact of capital structure on firm value, which
nvestigated the benefits and costs associated with the issuance of debt or stocks. The divergence between the subsequent
heories on capital structure is remarkable. Some studies accept the idea that an optimal capital structure exists (Jensen
nd Meckling, 1976) while, others reject this (Myers, 1984). These studies initially questioned the assumptions of
odigliani and Miller (1958), such as the assumption that individuals borrow at the same cost as companies. Other
ypotheses that have been criticized refer to market imperfections, taxation, and differences in risk between leveraged
nd non-leveraged firms. This discussion motivated our choice of the capital structure determinants used in our analysis.
Empirical studies indicate that companies today behave as if the debt level were an important factor in determining
ts value. However, there is no consensus regarding the factors that affect the leverage (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Fama
nd French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003a; Qiu and Smith, 2007).
.1.  Theories  of  capital  structure
Capital structure refers to the proportion of equity and other capital that firms use to finance its operations. Thus, debt
ay be considered a critical variable when determining a firm’s capital structure. According to conventional theories,
 combination of adequate financial sources can define a minimum value for a firm’s total capital cost to maximize
hareholder wealth (Harris and Raviv, 1991).
In general, the cost of equity would exceed the cost of debt, given the tax benefits for using debt, or because the
robability of failure impacts the creditors’ funding (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). In cases in which debt may be
eductible, it is expected that companies seek to maintain a capital structure with maximum leverage. In addition, there
re other benefits associated with debt, as it induces a more efficient behavior for managers (Stulz, 1990).
However, the debt ratio for Brazilian and American firms is usually not too high (Brito and Lima, 2005; Medeiros
nd Daher, 2008; Jensen, 1986). One reason for this is that the use of debt increases financial risk. In other words, the
igher the leverage, the higher the risk of bankruptcy, motivating lenders to increase loan premiums. Since there are
oth benefits and risks arising from level of indebtedness, Graham (2000) affirms there is an optimal capital structure.
.1.1. Trade-off
Trade-off theory (TO) is one of the most important theories supporting the existence of an optimal capital structure
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It argues that due to the trade-off between the benefits and costs of debt, firms choose
ptimal debt and stock levels. This model considers market imperfections which were ignored by Modigliani and
iller (1958), such as taxes, bankruptcy costs, and agency costs. Thus, the optimal degree of leverage minimizes costs
nd maximizes the value of the firm (Stulz, 1990).
According to the trade-off theory, companies have a debt target, which depends on certain variables. Miller (1977)
tates that the two main determinants of this target are taxes and bankruptcy costs associated with a company’s higher
ebt leverage. Jensen and Meckling (1976) analyze another class of determinant, agency costs, which result from two
ypes of conflicts: one between shareholders and managers, and another between shareholders and creditors.
Studies, such as DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), show that a company’s debt affects its value and is also sensitive
o factors such as bankruptcy and agency costs. According to these authors,1 factors such as size, social incentives,
epreciation and structure of assets (tangibility) also influence these costs. For example, larger companies and/or those
ith more tangible assets have lower bankruptcy costs.
.1.2. Pecking  order
The pecking order theory (PO) (Myers and Majluf, 1984) is based on the existence of asymmetric information
etween managers and investors, where managers use inside information to finance the firm when the companies assets
re overvalued.2 However, investors anticipate this action and discount the value of the firm, i.e., the firm’s value drops
hen a stock offering is announced. In turn, managers anticipate this discount and do not make certain investments,
referring to defer potential investments until the company has cash resources. Thus, information asymmetry leads to
1 Other studies: Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Brito and Lima (2005).
2 Ross (1977) presents a signaling model in which the manager knows the distribution of returns of firms. The empirical result is contrary to the
ne provided by the PO, in which profitability and debts are negatively correlated.
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Table 1
Forecasts on capital structure.
Variable Effects predicted
Trade-off Pecking order
Size + +/−
Profitability + −
Growth opportunity − −/+a
Tangibility + −
Volatility − −
a The PO in the weak form admits opportunity of growth positively correlated with leverage.
share undervaluation, and therefore managers are reluctant to issue new stocks on the market. This causes the hierarchy
of financial sources.
Therefore, companies usually prefer internal financing. If external financing is needed, debentures or securities (debt)
would be issued, before opting to issue shares. This theory holds that more profitable companies are less indebted,
since they can finance new projects without needing to take loans or issuing stocks.
The trade-off theory competes with the pecking order theory in certain aspects and both offer an explanation about
companies capital structure. One such aspect that they differ is profitability. For this variable, Shyam-Sunder and Myers
(1999) found evidence in favor of the PO in a study of U.S. companies, which shows that more profitable firms are
less leveraged. In Brazil, Medeiros and Daher (2008) tested both theories, and confirmed the PO prediction. Cesar
and Brito (2005) also evaluated the trade-off and pecking order theories, obtaining results similar to Fama and French
(2002), who concluded: “confirming the pecking order model but contradicting the trade-off model, more profitable
firms are less leveraged”.
These theories however, converge regarding other aspects, such as the prediction of the relation between leverage
and risk (volatility). The higher a company’s financial volatility, the riskier the company is, and hence, would have
higher borrowing costs.
2.1.3.  Market  timing
For a long time the debate on capital structure determinants was restricted to variables directly linked to the firms,
such as profitability, size, asset structure, among others. However, in the past decade, some studies have investigated
the effects of capital market variables (Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Alti, 2006), motivating the emergence of an influential
theory about capital structure; the market timing theory.
Baker and Wurgler (2002) developed the market timing theory (MT), which investigates some points not addressed
by traditional theories, like the issuance of stocks at opportune times with a relatively low capital cost compared to other
sources of capital. Their empirical tests showed that such behavior is recurrent in companies and therefore constitutes
another determinant of the degree of leverage. The authors define market timing as the practice of issuing stocks when
they are overvalued and buying them back when they are undervalued.
Baker and Wurgler (2002) investigated the use of MT analyzing the relationship between the issuance of stocks and
the use of proxies such as market-to-book ratio, i.e., the proportion of book value in relation to the market value of the
company. In Brazil, Rossi and Marotta (2010) tested the MT theory for Brazilian IPOs for 2004–2007. They confirmed
that companies adopted an opportunistic behavior by issuing a larger volume of stocks in “hot” times.3
2.2.  Capital  structure  forecasts
This subsection presents the main theoretical predictions based on the above-mentioned capital structure theories.
Despite similarities between trade-off and pecking order, these have different predictions on the effects of certain
variables. For example, for tangibility variable, these theories predict opposite effects regarding leverage. In order to
investigate the validity of these theories, we compare the empirical results with predictions made by each. Table 1
3 Terminology adapted from the literature.
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Table 2
Proxies and empirical evidence of capital structure determinants.
Determinant Proxy Reference
Size log(Total asset); log(Total receipt) FSH, TW, RZ, HR, BL, PF, CB, GF
Profitability EBITD/Total asset; EBITD/Equity RZ, GL, PF, BL; FSH
Opportunity of growth Market-to-book; Variation % in total asset; (Total
asset − Equity + Market value)/Total asset
FSH, RZ, GL, TW, FG, PF, BL, HR
Asset structure (tangibility) Permanent/Total asset; (Fixed asset + Stock)/Total Asset TW, PF, BL; FSH, RZ, Myers
Volatility of operational results (risk) Short term debt/Long term debt; SD EBITD/Average
EBITD
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•he variables in italic were used in our regressions. The acronyms of the last column refer to the initials of the authors previously cited. EBITD:
arnings before interest, tax and depreciation; SD: standard deviation.
hows the predictions of both the trade-off and pecking order theories for each factor affecting the level of indebtedness.
n order to understand the effect of each determinant, we examine separately each determinant, in order to determine
hich theory is better suited to.
Although MT has not been tested directly, certain inferences may be made. The MT theory has the same prediction of
O regarding the market-to-book variable: when stocks are overvalued, the preference for profit in financing investments
s replaced by stock issuance. This variable was used and accepted by Baker and Wurgler (2002) as a significant
eterminant of leverage.
On the other hand, QR allows the effects of determinants on capital structure to vary across quantiles. For example,
t could be the case that the lower the quantile, the smaller the profitability effect on the level of indebtedness. The QR
lso allows that the signal of the determinants to change according to the quantile, which would alter the variable’s
ogical interpretation. The bankruptcy costs and agency costs are the probable causes of changes in the coefficients
eterminants. Thus, the main focus of our analysis falls on the highest and lowest debt ratio quantiles, since the central
endencies have been analyzed previously by other authors (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2003b).
The type of debt, short or long term, can also affect results. Therefore, certain studies focus on different time frames,
ssessing the advantages and disadvantages of each. Moreira and Brito (2006) have reviewed the literature for Brazil.
I must be pointed out that there are certain characteristics of the Brazilian market that directly affect capital structure
ecisions and should be considered in studies like such as this, namely the high cost of stock issuance and the low
iquidity of small- and mid-sized firms. In addition, high interest rates make short-term financing unfeasible, especially
or small- and mid-sized firms (Medeiros and Daher, 2008). Gomes and Leal (2001) also mention that long-term credit
s scarce, and that the Brazilian long-term interest rate remains high by international standards.
.2.1. Determinants
Table 2 presents the key variables that have been investigated in the empirical literature on the determinants of
apital structure. This table contains information on the proxies used in other works. Each of these determinants has
ffects on the capital structure predicted by the pecking order and trade-off theories. Our study then verifies whether
he predictions of each theory are compatible with the results reported in Section 4.
 Size – Empirical evidence confirms that firm size directly influences the level of debt (Frank and Goyal, 2003b; Cesar
and Brito, 2005). Large firms have greater access to funding and take out loans more easily and at more favorable
rates. They are also less likely to fail because of their greater business diversity. Thus, these lower bankruptcy costs
increase their debt capacity. Another factor linked to size is their lifetime. Older companies usually have a larger
volume of information and greater investor confidence, which provides greater market access and lower costs for
loans (Harris and Raviv, 1991).
However, as Titman and Wessels (1988) and Fama and French (2002) pointed out, according to PO, smaller firms
take on more debt, due to their weaker cash flows and difficulty to issue stocks. In Brazil, the main justifications for
this point are higher costs of issuance and lower liquidity in the financial market (Medeiros and Daher, 2008).
 Growth opportunity – Our proxy for growth opportunity is the market-to-book variable, which indicates the value
of the stock at a given moment in time, indicating the best time to issue stocks/debt (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). For
TO, the greater the opportunity for growth, the more incentives there are to invest in the future and to prepare to
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disburse resources, as reflected by a lower leverage’s ratio. Therefore, the expected relation with debt is negative.
Moreover, in relation to quantiles, it is expected that more leveraged firms have higher bankruptcy costs and lower
opportunity for growth, because reducing the bargaining power of the borrowing firm.
In PO and MT, the same relation is expected, where the first assumes that firms with high market-to-book value
prefer to issue stocks than to take on debt. On the other hand, PO also asserts that greater opportunities for growth
increase the debt, since there are greater incentives to borrow. Fama and French (2002), who used the same proxy,
called it a simple or weak version of the PO theory. In Brazil, a factor that reinforces this preference for debt are the
high costs of issuance of stocks(Medeiros and Daher, 2008).
• Profitability – We have seen that trade-off is based on the theories of bankruptcy costs and agency costs. The first
holds that the risk of insolvency in profitable firms is smaller. The latter says that higher profits lead to serious conflicts
between shareholders and managers, which may induce managers to take on more debt. Therefore, trade-off predicts
a positive relationship between profitability and debt.
As for the PO theory, due to the hierarchy of sources of financing, the greater the profitability, the more internal
resources companies have to invest, thus lowering the need for borrowing. Therefore, the relation with the debt is
negative. Fama and French (2002) empirically corroborated this negative relation, refuting the trade-off theory. Cesar
and Brito (2005) and Medeiros and Daher (2008) also empirically confirmed the negative relation in the Brazilian
case.
• Structure of assets (tangibility) – It is expected that tangible assets be used as collateral for loans, reducing the costs
of bankruptcy, and therefore increasing the incentive to take on more debt, in accordance with the trade-off theory
(Rajan and Zingales, 1995).
Harris and Raviv (1991), in contrast to other studies, found that firms with fewer tangible assets face major
problems due to asymmetric information, as stated by the PO theory, which leads these companies to borrow rather
than issue stocks, ceteris  paribus.
Firms with more tangible assets are more able to take on long term debt (Brito and Lima, 2005). Given this
preference for long-term, less leveraged firms can lead to shorter maturity periods, making its relation to short-term
debt negative.
• Volatility of operational results: risk – Diversified firms usually are less volatile in terms of cash flows and therefore
less prone to fail. More volatile firms take on more short-term debt, increasing instability and the risk of bankruptcy,
which reduces their debt capacity (Moreira and Brito, 2006). For this reason, we use the short-term debt/long-term
debt ratio as a proxy for volatility, since an increase in this ratio reflects the increase in the firm’s risk.
At the same time, the asymmetry of information between lenders and investors increases with volatility. This risk
raises the price of the loan and reduces the power of the debt, leading to a preference for equity, according to the PO
theory.
3.  Methodology
The relationship between capital structure and its determinants is examined in the theoretical and empirical sections
of this study. Thus, in this section, we present the main tool used in this article, the quantile regression (QR), along
with the model and the database.
3.1.  Quantile  regression
Studies on the capital structure of Brazilian companies use methods such as OLS regression (Medeiros and Daher,
2008; Procianoy and Schnorrenberger, 2004), panel data (Medeiros and Daher, 2008; Brito and Lima, 2005) with fixed
effects (FE) or random effects, and the method proposed by Fama and Macbeth (1973) (Cesar and Brito, 2005). The
QR method is more robust to outliers (Hallock et al., 2010) and therefore more suitable for the analysis of the degree of
leverage, since it considers the conditional distribution of the dependent variable that, in our case, is not homogeneous.4
4 Homogeneity refers to the uniformity of the estimated coefficients between the quantiles, which must be constant.
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Koenker and Basset (1978) introduced QR5 and showed that this method is an extension of classical linear regression.
he OLS estimator focuses solely on a measure of central tendency, while QR describes data better, because it analyzes
he level of leverage, by quantile.
For example, many studies use OLS to estimate the variable effects on capital structure. The estimate obtained is a
alue that summarizes the relationship between the dependent and independent variables, assuming that the conditional
istribution is homogeneous. In this case, the level of leverage is irrelevant and the estimates of the determinants are
lways the same. Other studies exclude the extreme quantiles so as to eliminate outliers that distort the estimations
Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2003b; Procianoy and Schnorrenberger, 2004). However, ignoring such
bservations is not the best form of analysis (Hallock et al., 2010). QR estimates each quantile using the entire sample
nd attributes weights to the observations, by incorporating all available information. The discussion in Section 2
uggests that if there is a difference between the effects of bankruptcy costs and agency costs in each quantile, this
ould lead to changes in the estimated coefficients for each quantile.
We now present the methodology for QR. Let (yi, xi), i = 1, 2, . .  ., N  be the population of n  sample companies in
eriod t(t  = 1, 2, .  . ., T), where xi is the vector of the capital structure determinants (regressors), and yi the debt level
f company i. Assuming that the θth quantile of the conditional distribution of yi is linear in xi, we can write the
onditional quantile in the regression model as:
yi =  x′iβθ +  uiθ (1)
Quantyi (θ|xi) ≡  inf  [y  : Fi(y|x)≥θ] =  x′iβθ (2)
Quantui (θ|xi) =  0 (3)
here Quantyi (θ|xi) denotes the θth conditional quantile of yi, conditional on the regressor xi; βθ is the vector of
nknown parameters to be estimated for the different value of θ in (0,1)6; uiθ is the error term, and Fi(y|x) is the
umulative distribution function, conditional on x. By varying the value of θ between (0, 1), we can obtain the full
istribution of y, conditional on x. The estimator, βθ , is obtained by solving the problem:
min
βθ
n∑
i=1
ρθ(yi −  x′iβθ) ,  (4)
here ρθ is the loss function, defined as:{
θu,  if u≥0
(θ −  1)u,  if u  <  0 (5)
The function (4) calculates the residual terms and multiplies the values in (5). This estimator is found using linear
rogramming techniques (Koenker and Basset, 1978).
The standard method for estimating the covariance matrix of the parameters is the bootstrap method, available in
ost computer programs. Typically, the methods of inference overestimate the sample variance of the median and are
ot consistent. In such cases, the asymptotic distribution converges to the empirical distribution of the original sample,
nd the bootstrap method rectifies that. For these reasons, we use this method to estimate the covariance matrix. There
s a vast literature on the use of bootstrap resampling techniques.
.2.  Empirical  methodology
7We analyze the capital structure determinants for Brazilian companies using the OLS, FE and QR models. The QR
ethod was estimated for the quantiles 0.05, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 and 0.95. The OLS and FE regressions are performed to
pdate the Brazilian literature and verify the robustness of the QR results.
5 Several previous studies have introduced the ideas used by Koenker, in particular, the work of Boscovich and Laplace, who used a combination
f mean and median.
6 F−1 (1/2)) is related to the median and can be seen as a regression model of minimum absolute deviations.
7 R was the software used in the OLS, FE and QR estimates.
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Table 3
Types of debt.
Dependent variable Measure of debt Mathematical formula
totdeb Total debt (Long term liability + Current liability)/Total asset
ltdeb Long term debt Long term liability/Total asset
stdeb Short term debt Current liability/Total asset
The sample consisted of 394 publicly traded Brazilian companies. The data set available in Economática was built
from the consolidated financial statements of non-financial companies listed on the BM&FBovespa,8 between the
years 2000 and 2009.
Regarding the data matrix, we chose to use balanced data, i.e., we excluded firms with data missing for the entire
period, a procedure adopted in other works (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Medeiros and Daher, 2008), and we used the
average values of the selected period in most of the results.9
The empirical evidence for Brazil (Perobelli and Famá, 2001; Gomes and Leal, 2001; Procianoy and
Schnorrenberger, 2004; Brito and Lima, 2005; Cesar and Brito, 2005; Medeiros and Daher, 2008) suggests that size,
profitability, growth opportunities, leverage and volatility are the main determinants of capital structure, and he proxies
of these variables are described in Table 2.
As Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Brito and Lima (2005), Cesar and Brito (2005), and
others have showed, the regression analyzes leverage according to different definitions: short-term, long-term, and
total debt. Thus, it is possible to analyze the effect of determinants in more detail and to verify differences between the
results. The dependent variable, debt, in its different forms, can be seen in Table 3.
Fattouh et al. (2005) found heterogeneity in the capital structure determinants using QR. Qiu and Smith (2007)
performed a similar analysis and found that the determinant effects vary according to the degree of debt analyzed.
These two studies show that the QR inference is more robust and complete. In addition, it provides a better understanding
of the firms’ behavior with respect to leverage, allowing to test other theories, such as bankruptcy and agency costs.
This analysis has not been performed for the Brazilian case and is the main contribution of this article.
The OLS, FE and QR regressions are described below. The estimations are performed for different dependent
variables listed in Table 3, where N  = 1, 2, . .  . , 394 ; and T  = 2000, 2001, . .  ., 2009 on the longitudinal case::
Endi =  β0 +  β1ln(Size)i +  β2Prof i +  β3Growthi +  β4Tangi +  β5Voli +  ui (6)
Endit =  β0 +  β1ln(Size)it +  β2Prof it +  β3Growthit +  β4Tangit +  β5Volit + αi +  uit (7)
Endi =  β0θ +  β1θln(Size)i +  β2θProf i +  β3θGrowthi +  β4θTangi +  β5θVoli +  ui (8)
where End  are the types of debts listed in Table 3; ln(Size)  is the logarithm of the size of firm i  in period t, measured
by the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of reais10; Prof  is the profitability, measured by the ratio of EBIT
(earnings before interest and taxes, or operating profit minus administrative costs) and total assets; Growth  is the
proxy for the company’s annual growth opportunity, given by their market-to-book value; Tang  is the tangibility of
assets, determined as the proportion of tangible assets (permanent) to total assets, Vol  is the operational result volatility,
measured as the ratio of short-term debt to total debt11; αi is the unobservable time-invariant effect of firm i, and the
last term is the error.
8 Financial companies were excluded because of their peculiar capital structure, since they have an accounting structure that is different from
other types of firms.
9 We used the average between 2000 and 2009 in all analyses and regressions, except for FE, with annual values deflated by the IPCA issued by
IBGE, for the case of nominal variables. The analysis for a single year was not included in the study because of the specific context and time effect,
which could skew the results in a comparative case. Therefore, we do not present the results obtained with this estimation because they were similar
to those reported below.
10 In real terms, deflated by the IPCA-IBGE. This was the only variable transformed into logarithms.
11 In order to enhance the robustness of the results and check for endogeneity problems, regressions were made without this variable, which
obtained similar results to those found in the above regression.
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics of the data.
Variables Average Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
totdeb .6341 .5935 .3246 .09301 2.9042
ltdeb .3057 .2669 .2302 0 1.7791
stdeb .3284 .2886 .1928 .01410 1.5678
ln(Size) 13.3159 13.429 1.6679 8.4270 18.8739
Growth 2.1037 1.2991 3.1136 −6.1000 22.2412
Prof .05715 .07204 .1040 −.83963 .3613
tang .4449 .4683 .2164 .0022 .9876
vol 48.6746 45.2 24.2734 0 100
Table 5
Correlation between variables. Average for the years 2000–2009.
totdeb ltdeb stdeb ln(Size) Prof Growth tang vol
totdeb 1.000
ltdeb 0.8108 1.000
stdeb 0.7155 0.1713 1.000
ln(Size) −0.2286 −0.0991 −0.2665 1.000
Prof −0.4493 −0.3609 −0.3256 0.3478 1.000
Growth 0.0798 0.0984 0.0168 0.0035 0.1125 1.000
t
v
n
i
4
w
n
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y
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t
t
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w
t
lang 0.0624 0.2372 −0.1781 0.1313 −0.0093 0.0093 1.000
ol 0.1339 −0.1402 0.3927 −0.5083 −0.2927 0.0113 −0.2680 1.000
The above equations are expected to measure the effects and magnitudes of the capital structure determinants. The
ext section presents the results, discusses their significance and interprets these results in light of the theories discussed
n Section 2.
.  Empirical  results
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the data. Table 5 shows the cross-correlation between variables, where
e see the positive correlation of size with profitability, which is a consensus in the capital structure literature, and is
egative with volatility, in accordance with the theory of DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) and the results of Titman and
essels (1988).
Fig. 1 shows the evolution of the average level of leverage for Brazilian firms (total, short and long term). Over the
ears, companies have kept about half of their total debt in long-term debt. We also see that there was a decrease, as of
002, in the rates of total and long-term until in 2007, the year of the crisis, when they rose. The following year, when
he effects of the crisis were lower in Brazil, these rates dropped again.
Table 6 contains regression equations 9–11. OLS and quantile regressions were run on the average values for
he entire period of the study, and FE12 was ran using a panel from 2000 to 2009, where the Hausman test was
sed to define the panel method. The regressions were performed for the three forms of debt leverage. All esti-
ates were statistically significant at 1%. The power of explanation of the models, the R2s, generally decreased,
imilar to literature. In the OLS case, the R2s varied between 20 and 25% for the three types of debt. In the
E regression (similar in concept to R2s) ranged between 15 and 25%. And in the QR it varied between 5 and
5%.
Through the variance analysis and the parameter slope inequality test, we found that most of the QR coefficients
ere statistically different from each other between the quantiles analyzed, for the three forms of leverage. This justifies
he use of the QR method, which shows there are differences between quantiles for the determinants of the level of
everage.
12 The results of regressions for 2009 were similar to those showed in Table 6.
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Fig. 1. Evolution of the average rate of indebtedness of companies between 2000 and 2009. Total debt (totdeb): blue, long-term debt (ltdeb): red;
short-term debt (stdeb): green. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of the
article.)
We present the graphic results of the QR estimation (Figs. 2–4 in the Annex) in quantiles q  = (0, 02 ; 0, 04 ; .  .  .  ;1)
for the independent variables, in addition to the OLS estimates and their respective confidence intervals (CI). These
graps are a useful way of reading and interpreting the QR results, illustrating clearly the difference to the OLS results.
QR is statistically different from OLS for all variables, in at least one quantile. This is reflected in the magnitude of
the effects, which changes between quantiles, and reveals different interpretations for capital structure models. This
result was also found for other countries by Fattouh et al. (2005) and Qiu and Smith (2007).
On the other hand, there are also similarities between the estimates. For example, equal sign effects for most
regressions between the QR’s 0.50 quantile and the OLS, which captures the central tendency of the estimates. As
discussed in the previous section and confirmed by the results, the effects of the determinants on the short and long-term
debt leverage are distinct, if not opposite.
4.1.  OLS,  FE  and  QR
The OLS regression showed in most cases that the estimates had significant determinants according to the trade-off
and pecking order theories. These results are in line with the results obtained by most FE regression with equivalent
signs. A case in point is the study of Titman and Wessels (1988), where most of the OLS and FE estimators are in
agreement with the prediction of these theories, for both the short and long-term.
The measured effects were small and statistically insignificant for certain coefficients. Particularly, for size and
growth for short-term debt, and leverage and volatility for total debt. The effects on leverage of short and long-term
add up to total debt. In some cases, such as tangibility and volatility, the effects on short and long-term debt are
opposite.
The estimated parameters oscillated in QR, indicating that the magnitudes of the effects vary with the quantile, and
therefore, with the degree of leverage. Moreover, their sign changes in some cases, making the explanatory power of
the trade-off or pecking order theories depend on the leverage of the firm.
For example, for the last quantile (0.95), the long-term debt determinants are size, profitability, and tangibility, i.e.,
volatility and growth opportunities have no effect on the long-term debt leverage. This result is intuitive, because it is
probable that highly leveraged firms, and therefore, with high bankruptcy costs, are unable to pay back/borrow in the
long-term, even if they become more/less volatile or prone to grow. On the other hand, size, tangibility or profit can
influence the level of debt in the long-term, because if firms grow, they become less leveraged (by definition). However,
if they increase their guarantees, they become more able to borrow, and if they realize more profits they may reduce
debt.
Next, we present the results of the OLS, FE and QR regressions for each determinant, verifying the significance,
magnitude and effect of the estimators. Table 1 shows the prediction of each theory with respect to each variable, which
allows testing the consistency of the predictions of each theory.
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Table 6
Regressions: OLS/QR (average 2000–2009)/FE (2000–2009).
Regression Intercept ln(Size) Growth Prof tang vol
ltdeb
OLS .60010*** −.01640** .01088*** −.91949*** .18421*** −.0026***
(.1145) (.00739) (.00333) (.10805) (.04968) (.00051)
FE .32838*** 1.5e−10 −.00030 −.24397 *** .24549*** −.00235***
(.02277) (4.7e−10) (.00081) (.03267) (.03569) (.00019)
QR 0.05 −0.060 0.011** 0.007*** −0.047 0.081*** −0.001***
(0.063) (0.004) (0.001) (0.067) (0.027) (0.000)
QR 0.25 0.121* 0.011*** 0.005* −0.367*** 0.089*** −0.002***
(0.072) (0.004) (0.003) (0.089) (0.032) (0.000)
QR 0.50 0.334*** 0.004 0.008*** −0.665*** 0.139*** −0.003***
(0.093) (0.006) (0.002) (0.109) (0.044) (0.000)
QR 0.75 0.540*** −0.007 0.016*** −1.126*** 0.218*** −0.003***
(0.153) (0.009) (0.005) (0.211) (0.063) (0.001)
QR 0.95 1.338*** −0.057*** 0.031 −2.200*** 0.485*** −0.001
(0.325) (0.020) (0.023) (0.447) (0.159) (0.002)
stdeb
OLS .32170*** −.00312 .00257 −.44372*** −.09077** .00223***
(.09865) (.00636) (.00287) (.09304) (.04278) (.00044)
FE .19803*** −2.5e−10 −.00061 −.23272 *** .03249 .00273***
(.01960) (4.1e−10) (.00072) (.02890) (.03076) (.00017)
QR 0.05 −0.136 0.019*** 0.003 0.112 −0.105*** 0.001*
(0.095) (0.006) (0.004) (0.089) (0.040) (0.000)
QR 0.25 −0.010 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.048 −0.106*** 0.002***
(0.060) (0.004) (0.001) (0.077) (0.030) (0.000)
QR 0.50 0.151** 0.007* 0.007*** −0.251*** −0.151*** 0.003***
(0.062) (0.004) (0.002) (0.092) (0.035) (0.000)
QR 0.75 0.350*** −0.004 0.010** −0.294* −0.176*** 0.004***
(0.092) (0.005) (0.005) (0.154) (0.046) (0.000)
QR 0.95 1.109*** −0.045*** 0.011 −1.004*** −0.096 0.003***
(0.151) (0.011) (0.018) (0.382) (0.111) (0.001)
totdeb
OLS .92180*** −.01953* .01345*** −1.3632*** .09344 −.00039
(.16447) (.01061) (.00478) (.15510) (.07132) (.00073)
FE .52609*** −1.3e−10 −.00089 −.48326 *** .27919*** .00038
(.03308) (7.0e−10) (.00121) (.04838) (.05191) (.00028)
QR 0.05 0.093 0.020 0.022*** −0.284 −0.090 −0.001
(0.294) (0.018) (0.002) (0.405) (0.125) (0.001)
QR 0.25 0.237** 0.022*** 0.019*** −0.715*** −0.041 −0.001
(0.120) (0.008) (0.006) (0.176) (0.054) (0.001)
QR 0.50 0.488*** 0.011 0.017*** −1.204*** 0.016 0.000
(0.123) (0.007) (0.004) (0.131) (0.064) (0.001)
QR 0.75 0.923*** −0.015 0.014*** −1.384*** 0.148 0.001
(0.164) (0.011) (0.003) (0.211) (0.067) (0.001)
QR 0.95 1.926*** −0.061*** 0.020 −2.089*** −0.059 0.001
(0.314) (0.017) (0.011) (0.160) (0.156) (0.001)
Obs: standard errors in parentheses.
*** p-Value ≤ 1%.
** p-Value ≤ 5%.
4
T
c* p-Value ≤ 10%.
.1.1.  Size
The OLS estimation indicates a negative effect for size for the three debt leverage variables. The forecasts ofitman and Wessels (1988) and Fama and French (2002) are partially confirmed, since we found that size is negatively
orrelated with short-term debt in last quantile, being the case of the most leveraged firms. Thus, the prediction of both
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Fig. 2. QR (average 2000–2009 – ltdeb). ltdeb: black dots (QR); shaded area (95% of QR), red line (OLS) and dashed (95% OLS). (For interpretation
of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of the article.)
theories, trade-off and pecking order, are partially corroborated by the results. Therefore, our prediction is confirmed,
because the size effects on leverage for the last quantiles are greater on magnitude.
The QR captures distinct effects on the same variable, and indicates the validity of the three theories for the same
variable, enriching our results since they offer unprecedented contributions to the Brazilian literature. The relationship
between size and debt decreases with the quantile, but the effects have the same behavior for all three forms of debt
leverage. They are positive for the lower quantiles and negative for the higher quantiles (and statistically significant),
as accepted by the pecking order theory.
4.1.2.  Growth  opportunity
For the OLS and QR estimates, this variable was significant for the total and long-term debt and had a positive
relationship with all three forms of debt leverage. This result corroborates the study of Moreira and Brito (2006) and
indicates the acceptance of the weak/simple version of the PO theory, which was also found by Fama and French
(2002) for U.S. firms.QR estimates were not qualitatively different from those of the OLS, which indicates that the coefficients follow a
general trend. For the highest quantile, the estimates were not significant. The effect of growth disappears, probably
because it is difficult for highly leveraged companies to take on new debt due to the high costs of bankruptcy. As
for the lowest quantile, low leveraged companies have a higher borrowing margin thus the coefficient is positive and
significant for the total and long term debt, showing that the opportunity for growth increases debt.
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.1.3.  Proﬁtability
The OLS, FE and QR estimates reveal that profitability has a negative relation with debt in all forms. Thus, we
ccept the PO theory, a consensus among both Brazilian (Brito and Lima, 2005; Moreira and Brito, 2006; Medeiros
nd Daher, 2008) and foreign studies (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Fama and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003b).
We found that the absolute effect of profitability increases gradually with quantiles. The sensitivity of profitability
s higher in most leveraged companies. In Brazil, profit in the most leveraged companies leads to greater debt reduction
n comparison with lower leveraged firms. We speculate that the reason for this is that in most leveraged companies
rofits are directed toward the payment of debt, because they have greater urgency in decreasing such leverage. We
an conclude that PO theory is strengthened as the quantile increases, i.e., profitability increases reluctance to use debt
o finance the firm. This is another new result for Brazil, which was obtained with the use of QR method.
.1.4. Structure  of  assets:  tangibility
Tangibility has distinct effects on the short and long-term leverage, for both the OLS and QR estimates. In FE,
angibility is positively correlated with debt in its three forms. For the long term, the OLS, FE and QR estimates are
ositive and statistically significant, as also shown by Brito and Lima (2005), providing empirical evidence for the
rade-off theory. But in the short-term the effect is the opposite: the OLS and QR results were negative, in accordance
ith the PO theory. We note that the coefficient of tangibility on short and long-term debt increased with the quantiles
except for the last one, for the short-term). This result was expected, showing that the effect of guarantees is higher
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interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of the article.)
for most leveraged companies. The effect is ambiguous for the total leverage, because the effects of the short and
long-term add up, losing their statistical significance. In particular, QR estimates range widely across quantiles.
4.1.5. Volatility  of  operational  results:  risk
The coefficients estimated by the OLS, FE and QR methods for volatility were statistically significant for the
short and long-term leverages. For the total leverage, all estimates lost their significance. Long-term estimates were in
accordance with the trade-off and pecking order theories: higher risk leads to a decrease in long-term leverage, because
given the increase in volatility, firms must lower their bankruptcy costs. The QR estimates showed that the magnitude of
the effect increases with the quantile up to the 0.75 quantile, and then decreases. For highly leveraged companies, this
effect disappears in all leverage forms. We speculate that in the last quantile (not statistically significant) the risk does
not matter – companies do not take on/pay off loans, as they are highly leveraged. The short-term relation is positive
and increases with the quantile. The more leveraged the firm, the greater the effect of risk on short-term leverage,
because these firms cannot rely on long-term debt.
5.  Concluding  remarksThis paper used the quantile regression (QR) method to investigate the determinants of debt leverage for Brazilian
companies. Significant differences were found in the estimates between quantiles and between OLS and FE. The
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ifference between the QR and OLS estimators mainly indicates that QR does not follow the general trend observed
n previous studies, which demonstrates the importance of using this method.
QR better described the distribution of Brazilian company borrowing. Coefficients that are usually assumed to be
onstant are distinguished by quantile and showed significant statistical differences. Thus, debt issuance policies vary
ccording to the degree of leverage of the company. Up until now, this point has been disregarded in Brazilian studies
hat examined the relationship between capital structure with their determinants. Thus, we bring new insights to the
nalysis of Brazilian forms of capital structure. For example, in most Brazilian studies, profitability has a negative
ffect on leverage, i.e., the estimator is calculated independent form the company’s level of leverage. Through the QR
ethod, we found that the effect of profitability is lower for companies with lower debt leverage (lower quantile) and
igher for more leveraged firms (higher quantile). We infer that the main reasons for this difference are the costs of
ankruptcy and agency corresponding to debt levels, as represented by quantiles.
In previous Brazilian studies, most estimates support the pecking order theory. In this study, the competing underlying
ssumptions and predictions of the trade-off and pecking order theories may be accepted simultaneously, since the
ariable effects change with quantiles. Nevertheless, the results for variations in size and profitability showed that the
ecking order theory becomes stronger as the quantile increases.
However, other factors also influence the acceptance of the above theories, i.e., different types of debt can support
ore than one theory. For example, in the case of tangibility, it corroborates the trade-off theory for long-term leverage
nd the pecking order theory for the short-term leverage. Thus, the analysis of variables, determined by type of debt,
articularly quantile, provides support for both the trade-off and pecking order theories.
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